Weak / Outdated TLS Config

← Insecure Communication

weak_tls_config   MEDIUM

CategoryInsecure Communication
OWASP Mobile (2024)M5
MASVSMASVS-NETWORK-1
MASWEMASWE-0026
MASTG (v2 tests)iOSMASTG-TEST-0348AndroidMASTG-TEST-0217MASTG-TEST-0218
MASTG demosiOSMASTG-DEMO-0110AndroidNone published
CWECWE-326CWE-327
PlatformAndroidiOS

Description

Negotiates deprecated TLS versions / weak cipher suites.

How it works

The TLS client permits deprecated protocol versions (SSLv3, TLS 1.0) and weak cipher suites (RC4, 3DES, export grade), with no forward secrecy or downgrade protection, and skips certificate validation. It makes a real TLS connection to your capture host and reports the actual negotiated protocol and certificate; run testssl.sh against the endpoint to confirm the weak options a downgrade attacker would force.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

  1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Insecure Communication category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an emulator/simulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: testssl.sh, mitmproxy, Wireshark.
  2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Weak / Outdated TLS Config (weak_tls_config). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
  3. Exploit. Route the app through an intercepting proxy (Burp/mitmproxy) with your CA installed, trigger the network call, and confirm you can read or modify traffic (cleartext, weak TLS, or a trivially-bypassed pin).
  4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
  5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.
  6. Map it back. Cross-reference the MASTG v2 test(s) MASTG-TEST-0217, MASTG-TEST-0218, MASTG-TEST-0348 for the canonical procedure and remediation.

Tools (optional)