Unverified Model Supply Chain

← AI/ML (OWASP LLM/GenAI Top 10)

unverified_model_supply_chain   MEDIUM

CategoryAI/ML (OWASP LLM/GenAI Top 10)
OWASP Mobile (2024)M2
MASVSMASVS-NETWORK-1MASVS-CODE-3
MASWEMASWE-0048
MASTG (v2 tests)iOSNone publishedAndroidMASTG-TEST-0233MASTG-TEST-0338
CWECWE-494CWE-345
PlatformAndroidiOS

Description

Model update fetched from an unauthenticated URL with no checksum.

How it works

Model updates are fetched over plain HTTP from a hardcoded update URL with no checksum or signature check, so a malicious mirror or on-path attacker serves a poisoned model and the app installs it. The demo performs a real cleartext GET and installs whatever comes back, unverified.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

  1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the AI/ML (OWASP LLM/GenAI Top 10) category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an emulator/simulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: mitmproxy, Burp Suite.
  2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Unverified Model Supply Chain (unverified_model_supply_chain). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
  3. Exploit. Send the crafted prompt / poisoned content to the in-app assistant and confirm the model obeys it - leaked system prompt/secret, an unconfirmed tool call, or attacker-controlled output.
  4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
  5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.
  6. Map it back. Cross-reference the MASTG v2 test(s) MASTG-TEST-0233, MASTG-TEST-0338 for the canonical procedure and remediation.

Tools (optional)