Typosquatted Dependency

← Supply Chain (OWASP Mobile M2)

typosquatted_dependency   EASY

Description

Depends on a lookalike package name mimicking a trusted one.

How it works

Typosquatted dependencies use lookalike package names that mimic trusted ones (a missing letter, a swap); the squatted package runs its own code in your build/app. This repo does not actually depend on these lookalikes; the sample below is an illustrative comparison of squatted vs. real names. Verify your real resolved tree with dart pub deps.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Supply Chain (OWASP Mobile M2) category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an emulator/simulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: pubspec review, osv-scanner, MobSF · Android: gradle/Maven inspection · iOS: CocoaPods/SPM.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Typosquatted Dependency (typosquatted_dependency). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. Inspect the dependency/SDK surface (lockfiles, bundled SDKs, update channel) and confirm the untrusted or unverified component is accepted - e.g. a substituted package, an unsigned artifact, or a silent post-deploy update.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.
6. Map it back. Cross-reference the MASTG v2 test(s) MASTG-TEST-0272, MASTG-TEST-0273 for the canonical procedure and remediation.

Tools (optional)

• pubspec review
• osv-scanner
• MobSF

Android

• gradle/Maven inspection

iOS

• CocoaPods/SPM