Missing / Stale SBOM (No Component Inventory)

← Supply Chain (OWASP Mobile M2)

sbom_missing_or_stale   EASY

Description

No Software Bill of Materials is produced, so bundled SDKs and their known-vulnerable versions are invisible to defenders.

How it works

The app bundles third-party SDKs (image_loader, analytics_sdk, net_http, and others) and some are pinned to versions with publicly-known CVEs. But the build ships no Software Bill of Materials, so there is no component inventory to cross-reference against advisory feeds. You cannot audit what you never inventoried, so the vulnerable components stay invisible, the same blind spot that lets a stale, known-vulnerable SDK ride along in a release. This is an offline, deterministic simulation: the “advisory feed” is a local map. Generating an SBOM (CycloneDX) and auditing it surfaces the exact components that the blind path misses.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Supply Chain (OWASP Mobile M2) category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an emulator/simulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: cyclonedx, osv-scanner, pubspec review · Android: gradle/Maven inspection · iOS: CocoaPods/SPM.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Missing / Stale SBOM (No Component Inventory) (sbom_missing_or_stale). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. Inspect the dependency/SDK surface (lockfiles, bundled SDKs, update channel) and confirm the untrusted or unverified component is accepted - e.g. a substituted package, an unsigned artifact, or a silent post-deploy update.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.
6. Map it back. Cross-reference the MASTG v2 test(s) MASTG-TEST-0274, MASTG-TEST-0275 for the canonical procedure and remediation.

Tools (optional)

• cyclonedx
• osv-scanner
• pubspec review

Android

• gradle/Maven inspection

iOS

• CocoaPods/SPM