Privacy Control Alternate-Path Bypass

← Privacy (OWASP Mobile M6)

privacy_control_alternate_path_bypass   HARD

Description

App functionality reaches protected data through an ALTERNATE path that sidesteps the platform privacy control (a different API, a shared container / app group, an extension, a cached copy) instead of going through the gated, consent-checked path, so the user’s privacy preference is bypassed rather than merely over-requested (iOS CVE-2026-20606 privacy-preference bypass class).

How it works

App functionality reaches protected data (contacts) through an alternate path, a shared app-group cache holding a copy of the same data, that sidesteps the platform privacy control instead of the gated, consent-checked path. The user’s privacy preference is bypassed rather than merely over-requested (iOS CVE-2026-20606 privacy-preference bypass class). Here contacts are read from the app-group cache even though consent was never granted. This is an offline, deterministic simulation. The secure path funnels all reads through the single consent-checked accessor so the alternate path is closed.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Privacy (OWASP Mobile M6) category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an emulator/simulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: frida, frida-trace · Android: jadx, adb · iOS: ipsw, class-dump.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Privacy Control Alternate-Path Bypass (privacy_control_alternate_path_bypass). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. Trigger the data-access/telemetry path and confirm sensitive data is collected, transmitted, or associated without the required consent / transparency prompt.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.

Tools (optional)

• frida
• frida-trace

Android

• jadx
• adb

iOS

• ipsw
• class-dump

Real-world references

Concrete public disclosures that match this vulnerability class:

• About the security content of iOS 18.7.5 (CVE-2026-20606 privacy-preference bypass)