PII in Analytics Events

← Privacy (OWASP Mobile M6)

pii_in_analytics_events   MEDIUM

CategoryPrivacy (OWASP Mobile M6)
OWASP Mobile (2024)M6
MASVSMASVS-PRIVACY-1
MASWEMASWE-0069
MASTG (v2 tests)iOSNone publishedAndroidMASTG-TEST-0318MASTG-TEST-0319
MASTG demosiOSNone publishedAndroidMASTG-DEMO-0081
CWECWE-359CWE-200
PlatformAndroidiOS

Description

Raw PII (email, precise location) sent unfiltered in analytics events.

How it works

Analytics events attach raw PII (email, full name, precise location, device id) and send it to the analytics endpoint unfiltered. PII should be stripped, hashed, or aggregated before leaving the device. A pentester reads it in mitmproxy.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

  1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Privacy (OWASP Mobile M6) category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an emulator/simulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: mitmproxy, Burp Suite, Wireshark.
  2. Locate the target. From the home index, open PII in Analytics Events (pii_in_analytics_events). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
  3. Exploit. Trigger the data-access/telemetry path and confirm sensitive data is collected, transmitted, or associated without the required consent / transparency prompt.
  4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
  5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.
  6. Map it back. Cross-reference the MASTG v2 test(s) MASTG-TEST-0318, MASTG-TEST-0319 for the canonical procedure and remediation.

Tools (optional)