PendingIntent Provenance Confusion

← Improper Platform Usage

pendingintent_provenance_confusion   HARD

Description

An SDK/receiver assumes ‘who presents a PendingIntent’ == ‘who created it’, so a replayed/forwarded PendingIntent authenticates an attacker as the creating app (PendingIntent provenance-confusion research, arXiv 2603.02539).

How it works

A PendingIntent is a capability that can be forwarded, stored, and replayed. This SDK authenticates a caller by trusting what the token claims (its creatorPackage) instead of verifying who actually presents it. So a token minted by a trusted app, once forwarded to or stolen by a malicious app, lets the attacker present it and be authenticated as the trusted app, a confused-deputy or provenance-confusion flaw (arXiv 2603.02539). This is an offline, deterministic simulation: the token is a plain value and authentication returns the attributed identity. The strict authenticator binds the capability to its creator and requires a non-replayable, immutable, single-use token, rejecting the mismatch.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Improper Platform Usage category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an Android emulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: adb, drozer, jadx.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open PendingIntent Provenance Confusion (pendingintent_provenance_confusion). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. From a co-resident/attacker context (adb shell am start/drozer, or a crafted deep link / QR), send the untrusted input to the exported component or WebView and confirm the app performs the unsafe action (navigation, JS execution, file/URI access) with no validation.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.
6. Map it back. Cross-reference the MASTG v2 test(s) MASTG-TEST-0381 for the canonical procedure and remediation.

Tools (optional)

• adb
• drozer
• jadx

Attack inputs

Payloads/artifacts you author for the on-device attack. The demo already ships and simulates these in-process (e.g. the malicious companion app / crafted intent is emulated inside the screen), so you only need to craft them to reproduce the exploit on a real device:

• malicious companion app