Passkey Registration/Deletion Authorization Missing

← Insecure Authentication / Authorization

passkey_credential_management_authz   MEDIUM

Description

Passkey register/replace/delete endpoints don’t re-authorize the acting user, so an attacker can add their own passkey or delete the victim’s, causing account takeover or lockout (USENIX 2026 PASSKEYS-ATTACKER class).

How it works

The passkey register and delete endpoints trust the caller-supplied target account and never re-authorize the acting user. An attacker enrolls their own passkey onto the victim (takeover) and deletes the victim’s passkey (lockout). A correct endpoint checks that the caller owns the target account. Scope: the FIDO2 signature is assumed valid (signature verification is out of scope); the flaw demonstrated is in the relying-party authorization logic on top of it.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Insecure Authentication / Authorization category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an emulator/simulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: webauthn test harness, Burp Suite, mitmproxy.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Passkey Registration/Deletion Authorization Missing (passkey_credential_management_authz). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. Drive the authentication/authorization path, capture the token / assertion / decision, then replay or tamper with it (mitmproxy, a WebAuthn test harness, or by editing the value) and confirm the server-side check accepts the manipulated request.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.

Tools (optional)

• webauthn test harness
• Burp Suite
• mitmproxy

Real-world references

Concrete public disclosures that match this vulnerability class:

• USENIX Security 2026: The State of Passkeys