No Tracking Transparency Prompt

← Privacy (OWASP Mobile M6)

no_tracking_transparency_prompt   EASY

CategoryPrivacy (OWASP Mobile M6)
OWASP Mobile (2024)M6
MASVSMASVS-PRIVACY-3
MASWEMASWE-0074
MASTG (v2 tests)iOSMASTG-TEST-0281AndroidNone
CWECWE-359
PlatformiOS

Description

Cross-app tracking begins with no ATT-equivalent prompt.

How it works

The app begins cross-app tracking, reading the advertising ID, persisting it, and POSTing it to a tracking endpoint, without ever showing an App Tracking Transparency (or equivalent) prompt or honoring an opt-out. Point the capture base at your listener and the advertising id appears on the wire.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

  1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Privacy (OWASP Mobile M6) category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an iOS simulator / a device you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: mitmproxy.
  2. Locate the target. From the home index, open No Tracking Transparency Prompt (no_tracking_transparency_prompt). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
  3. Exploit. Trigger the data-access/telemetry path and confirm sensitive data is collected, transmitted, or associated without the required consent / transparency prompt.
  4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
  5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.
  6. Map it back. Cross-reference the MASTG v2 test(s) MASTG-TEST-0281 for the canonical procedure and remediation.

Tools (optional)