Lock-Screen Control / Widget Action Authorization

← Privileged System-Provider Activation

lockscreen_control_action_authorization   MEDIUM

Description

A Control Widget / interactive widget exposed on the Lock Screen, Control Center, or Action Button invokes a sensitive App Intent without the authentication the full app would require, so a physically-present attacker triggers a privileged operation from a locked device. The question is whether a system surface can invoke a sensitive op without the app’s own auth gate (Apple WidgetKit Control lock-screen action-authorization class).

How it works

A WidgetKit Control / interactive widget on the Lock Screen, Control Center, or Action Button can invoke an App Intent. If a sensitive intent (unlock the front door, disable the alarm) runs without the authentication the full app would require, a physically-present attacker triggers a privileged operation from a locked device. The system surface offering the control is not the app’s auth gate. On iOS this is backed by a real App Intent (UnlockFrontDoorIntent) shipped in the app binary that declares no authentication policy, so the system runs it from a locked device; off-iOS it uses a deterministic model. The secure path requires unlock or biometric for sensitive intents regardless of surface, deferring until authenticated while still allowing non-sensitive intents like a flashlight toggle.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Privileged System-Provider Activation category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an iOS simulator / a device you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: frida, objection, idb.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Lock-Screen Control / Widget Action Authorization (lockscreen_control_action_authorization). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. Drive the provider-activation / enablement workflow (accessibility, notification-listener, VPN, IME, phone-account, MediaProjection, credential-provider) and confirm the granted capability is invoked on an untrusted caller’s behalf - the enablement flow is the boundary.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.

Tools (optional)

• frida
• objection
• idb

Attack inputs

Payloads/artifacts you author for the on-device attack. The demo already ships and simulates these in-process (e.g. the malicious companion app / crafted intent is emulated inside the screen), so you only need to craft them to reproduce the exploit on a real device:

• crafted control-widget invocation

Real-world references

Concrete public disclosures that match this vulnerability class:

• Apple: WidgetKit Controls (Control Center / Lock Screen / Action Button surfaces)