Lock-State Confusion Data Exposure

← Privacy (OWASP Mobile M6)

lock_state_confusion_data_exposure   MEDIUM

Description

Sensitive data or a privileged action is reachable while the device is LOCKED through an accessibility / notification / widget / VoiceOver path that never re-checks the keyguard, so the lock-screen boundary is bypassed and protected content is exposed on a locked device (iOS CVE-2026-20645 / CVE-2026-20661 lock-screen VoiceOver disclosure class).

How it works

Sensitive data is reachable while the device is locked through an alternate path, an accessibility, notification, widget, or VoiceOver surface, that never re-checks the keyguard, so the lock-screen boundary is bypassed and protected content is exposed on a locked device (iOS CVE-2026-20645 / CVE-2026-20661 lock-screen VoiceOver disclosure class). Here the VoiceOver path reads the full wallet balance while the phone is locked, and the same sensitive content is driven onto a real locked surface by posting an actual OS notification (observable via adb shell dumpsys notification or the lock screen). The keyguard-confusion decision logic is real; the in-memory model is retained as the offline fallback when no native surface is available. The secure path re-checks the lock state on every path and returns only redacted content while locked.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Privacy (OWASP Mobile M6) category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an emulator/simulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: Android: adb, scrcpy · iOS: idevicescreenshot.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Lock-State Confusion Data Exposure (lock_state_confusion_data_exposure). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. Trigger the data-access/telemetry path and confirm sensitive data is collected, transmitted, or associated without the required consent / transparency prompt.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.
6. Map it back. Cross-reference the MASTG v2 test(s) MASTG-TEST-0246 for the canonical procedure and remediation.

Tools (optional)

Android

• adb
• scrcpy

iOS

• idevicescreenshot

Real-world references

Concrete public disclosures that match this vulnerability class:

• About the security content of iOS 18.7.5 (CVE-2026-20645 / CVE-2026-20661 locked-device disclosure)