Intent Argument Injection -> Local Code Execution

← Improper Platform Usage

intent_arg_injection_rce   HARD

Description

An exported component feeds an attacker-controlled intent extra / command-line arg into an execution path, so another app runs code with this app’s privileges (Unity CVE-2025-59489 class).

How it works

An exported “launcher” component reads attacker-controlled intent extras (a command, a library path, a runtime flag) and feeds them straight into an execution path. A malicious app can therefore send an intent that selects a privileged op, dumping app secrets or “loading” an attacker-supplied library path, which runs with this app’s privileges (the Unity CVE-2025-59489 class). This is an offline, deterministic simulation: the intent is a map of extras and the executor maps op strings to effects. A secure handler allowlists only safe navigation actions and ignores any injected execution arg.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Improper Platform Usage category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an Android emulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: adb, drozer, jadx, apktool.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Intent Argument Injection -> Local Code Execution (intent_arg_injection_rce). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. From a co-resident/attacker context (adb shell am start/drozer, or a crafted deep link / QR), send the untrusted input to the exported component or WebView and confirm the app performs the unsafe action (navigation, JS execution, file/URI access) with no validation.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.

Tools (optional)

• adb
• drozer
• jadx
• apktool