Insecure Credential Manager / Autofill Integration

← Insecure Authentication / Authorization

insecure_credential_manager   MEDIUM

Description

Misuses the Android Credential Manager / iOS AutoFill: associates credentials with an unverified domain and lets autofill cache secrets into insecure fields.

How it works

The app associates saved credentials with any requested domain without verifying the Digital Asset Links (Android) or AASA (iOS) association, so a phishing look-alike domain is trusted like the real one. It then autofills the secret into a plaintext, keyboard-cacheable field. A secure integration only associates with cryptographically verified domains and requires secure fields.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Insecure Authentication / Authorization category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an emulator/simulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: objection, frida, r2frida · Android: adb, drozer, jadx, apktool · iOS: ipsw, class-dump, Hopper.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Insecure Credential Manager / Autofill Integration (insecure_credential_manager). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. Drive the authentication/authorization path, capture the token / assertion / decision, then replay or tamper with it (mitmproxy, a WebAuthn test harness, or by editing the value) and confirm the server-side check accepts the manipulated request.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.
6. Map it back. Cross-reference the MASTG v2 test(s) MASTG-TEST-0393, MASTG-TEST-0313, MASTG-TEST-0316 for the canonical procedure and remediation.

Tools (optional)

• objection
• frida
• r2frida

Android

• adb
• drozer
• jadx
• apktool

iOS

• ipsw
• class-dump
• Hopper