Identity Credential / mDL Presentation Not Bound

← Insecure Authentication / Authorization

identity_credential_presentation_binding   HARD

Description

A verifier accepts a digital-identity presentation (mDL/mDoc via Identity Credential / ISO 18013-5, or a Wallet identity assertion) without binding it to THIS session: it trusts caller-supplied holder metadata, skips the session-transcript / origin check, does not enforce user-presence, and confuses issuer identity with holder identity - so a replayed or relayed presentation from another session is accepted. Distinct from passkey/WebAuthn: this is the digital-ID / proximity-credential stack. The secure path verifies the issuer signature, binds the device-signed response to the session transcript + reader nonce, and requires fresh user presence.

How it works

A verifier accepts a digital-identity presentation (mDL/mDoc via Identity Credential / ISO 18013-5) without binding it to this session: it checks only the issuer signature and trusts holder claims, skipping the session-transcript / reader-nonce check and user-presence. So a presentation captured from another session is replayed and accepted. This is the digital-ID / proximity-credential stack, distinct from passkey/WebAuthn. The secure path additionally requires the device signature to be over the current session transcript plus reader nonce and requires fresh user presence, so the replay is rejected while a genuine in-session presentation is accepted.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Insecure Authentication / Authorization category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an emulator/simulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: mitmproxy · Android: jadx · iOS: ipsw, Hopper.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Identity Credential / mDL Presentation Not Bound (identity_credential_presentation_binding). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. Drive the authentication/authorization path, capture the token / assertion / decision, then replay or tamper with it (mitmproxy, a WebAuthn test harness, or by editing the value) and confirm the server-side check accepts the manipulated request.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.

Tools (optional)

• mitmproxy

Android

• jadx

iOS

• ipsw
• Hopper

Attack inputs

Payloads/artifacts you author for the on-device attack. The demo already ships and simulates these in-process (e.g. the malicious companion app / crafted intent is emulated inside the screen), so you only need to craft them to reproduce the exploit on a real device:

• replayed mDL presentation
• spoofed holder metadata

Real-world references

Concrete public disclosures that match this vulnerability class:

• ISO/IEC 18013-5 mDL + Android Identity Credential: session-transcript binding