Frida Detection Bypass

← Insufficient Resilience

frida_detection_bypass   HARD

CategoryInsufficient Resilience
OWASP Mobile (2024)M7
MASVSMASVS-RESILIENCE-2
MASWEMASWE-0065
MASTG (v2 tests)iOSMASTG-TEST-0354AndroidMASTG-TEST-0341
MASTG demosiOSMASTG-DEMO-0118AndroidMASTG-DEMO-0107
CWECWE-693
PlatformAndroidiOS

Description

Frida detection greps for a fixed string easily disabled.

How it works

A real native probe scans the loaded libraries (dyld images on iOS, /proc/self/maps on Android) for frida-gadget/frida-agent/libfrida and checks the default frida port (27042). But the app collapses the decision to a fixed-substring match or a client-side boolean, so renaming the frida-gadget or moving the port evades it. Toggling “rename gadget” bypasses it.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

  1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Insufficient Resilience category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an emulator/simulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: frida, r2frida, objection.
  2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Frida Detection Bypass (frida_detection_bypass). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
  3. Exploit. Attach an instrumentation tool (frida/objection) and hook or patch the single client-side check, confirming the protection flips to ‘pass’ and the guarded functionality unlocks.
  4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
  5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.
  6. Map it back. Cross-reference the MASTG v2 test(s) MASTG-TEST-0341, MASTG-TEST-0354 for the canonical procedure and remediation.

Tools (optional)