Exported Component -> Unauthorized State Manipulation

← Improper Platform Usage

exported_component_state_manipulation   MEDIUM

Description

An exported component accepts an attacker-controlled identifier in its intent extras and performs a security-sensitive STATE CHANGE (e.g. cancelling the victim’s AI-chat notification) with no caller/ownership validation, so any co-resident app mutates state it does not own (Datadog Android CVE-2026-47361 class).

How it works

An exported component accepts an attacker-controlled notification id in its intent extras and performs a security-sensitive state change (cancelling the notification) with no caller or ownership validation. Because it is exported, a co-resident unprivileged app sends an intent naming the victim AI-chat app’s notification id and the system cancels it on the attacker’s behalf (the Datadog Android CVE-2026-47361 class), suppressing an alert the attacker does not own. This is an offline, deterministic simulation: an in-memory notification center holds notifications owned by package ids. The secure path verifies the notification’s owner package matches the caller (or a signature permission) before mutating, so the cross-owner request is refused and the victim’s notification stays active.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Improper Platform Usage category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an Android emulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: adb, drozer, jadx.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Exported Component -> Unauthorized State Manipulation (exported_component_state_manipulation). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. From a co-resident/attacker context (adb shell am start/drozer, or a crafted deep link / QR), send the untrusted input to the exported component or WebView and confirm the app performs the unsafe action (navigation, JS execution, file/URI access) with no validation.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.
6. Map it back. Cross-reference the MASTG v2 test(s) MASTG-TEST-0364 for the canonical procedure and remediation.

Tools (optional)

• adb
• drozer
• jadx

Real-world references

Concrete public disclosures that match this vulnerability class:

• CVE-2026-47361 (Datadog Android exported-activity notification cancel)