Cross-Profile (Work/Personal) Data & Capability Leakage

← Improper Platform Usage

cross_profile_data_capability_leakage   HARD

Description

Managed (work) and primary (personal) profiles are a security boundary, but the app crosses it unsafely - forwarded intents, URI grants, shared files, notifications, clipboard, contacts, or account data move between profiles without the required affordance/authorization, so work data leaks to a personal surface (or vice-versa). This is a tenant-boundary violation on top of Android’s cross-profile intent-forwarding machinery, distinct from ordinary intent redirection (Android managed-profile cross-profile leakage class).

How it works

Work (managed) and personal (primary) profiles are a security boundary, but the app crosses it unsafely. A forwarded intent, URI grant, or shared item moves between profiles with no policy check and no required user affordance, so a work credential (a corporate VPN password) lands on a personal surface. This is a tenant-boundary violation on top of Android cross-profile intent-forwarding, distinct from ordinary intent redirection. This offline demo forwards an in-memory work credential to a personal share sheet. The secure path enforces a cross-profile policy, so only whitelisted, non-sensitive item types may cross with the required affordance, and the sensitive work credential is denied and never crosses.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Improper Platform Usage category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an Android emulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: adb, drozer, jadx.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Cross-Profile (Work/Personal) Data & Capability Leakage (cross_profile_data_capability_leakage). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. From a co-resident/attacker context (adb shell am start/drozer, or a crafted deep link / QR), send the untrusted input to the exported component or WebView and confirm the app performs the unsafe action (navigation, JS execution, file/URI access) with no validation.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.

Tools (optional)

• adb
• drozer
• jadx

Attack inputs

Payloads/artifacts you author for the on-device attack. The demo already ships and simulates these in-process (e.g. the malicious companion app / crafted intent is emulated inside the screen), so you only need to craft them to reproduce the exploit on a real device:

• cross-profile forwarding intent
• malicious companion app

Real-world references

Concrete public disclosures that match this vulnerability class:

• Android CDD: cross-profile intent forwarding and managed-profile UI separation