Cross-App Browser History Access

← Privacy (OWASP Mobile M6)

cross_app_browser_history_access   MEDIUM

Description

The app reads browsing history that belongs to another app / the system browser (a shared or world-readable history store) with no user consent, exposing the user’s Safari/browser history across a privacy boundary (iOS CVE-2026-20656 Safari-history access class).

How it works

The app reads browsing history that belongs to another app or the system browser (a shared or world-readable history store) with no user consent, exposing the user’s Safari/browser history across a privacy boundary (iOS CVE-2026-20656 Safari-history access class). This offline demo models the other app’s history and a permission flag in memory. The secure path requires explicit user consent and scoping, returning nothing without consent and never dumping the other app’s private history wholesale.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Privacy (OWASP Mobile M6) category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an emulator/simulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: frida, sqlite3 · Android: adb, run-as · iOS: ifuse, afcclient.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Cross-App Browser History Access (cross_app_browser_history_access). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. Trigger the data-access/telemetry path and confirm sensitive data is collected, transmitted, or associated without the required consent / transparency prompt.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.
6. Map it back. Cross-reference the MASTG v2 test(s) MASTG-TEST-0007 for the canonical procedure and remediation.

Tools (optional)

• frida
• sqlite3

Android

• adb
• run-as

iOS

• ifuse
• afcclient

Real-world references

Concrete public disclosures that match this vulnerability class:

• About the security content of iOS 18.7.5 (CVE-2026-20656 Safari history access)