Credential Provider Release Authorization Failure

← Insecure Authentication / Authorization

credential_provider_release_authorization   HARD

Description

A credential-provider / password-manager extension releases a stored credential or passkey assertion without validating the calling app / relying-party identity or the user-verification state, so a spoofed calling app or a relying-party mismatch obtains a credential (or enumerates entries) - the credential-release boundary, broader than WebAuthn itself (Apple/Android credential-provider extension authorization class).

How it works

A credential-provider / password-manager extension releases a stored credential or passkey assertion without validating the calling app identity, the relying-party (rpId) binding, or the user-verification state. A spoofed calling app therefore extracts the bank credential (rpId or calling-app mismatch, no user verification), and the API even lets any caller enumerate the stored relying parties. The secure path validates that the calling app is bound to the rpId (asset-links / associated-domains style), requires user verification, and refuses enumeration.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Insecure Authentication / Authorization category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an emulator/simulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: frida, objection, r2frida · Android: adb, drozer, jadx · iOS: ipsw, class-dump, Hopper.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Credential Provider Release Authorization Failure (credential_provider_release_authorization). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. Drive the authentication/authorization path, capture the token / assertion / decision, then replay or tamper with it (mitmproxy, a WebAuthn test harness, or by editing the value) and confirm the server-side check accepts the manipulated request.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.

Tools (optional)

• frida
• objection
• r2frida

Android

• adb
• drozer
• jadx

iOS

• ipsw
• class-dump
• Hopper

Real-world references

Concrete public disclosures that match this vulnerability class:

• Apple: Passkey use in web browsers (credential provider release boundary)