Content Provider SQL Injection

← Improper Platform Usage

content_provider_sql_injection   HARD

Description

Exported content provider builds SQL by string concatenation.

How it works

An exported content provider concatenates the caller-supplied selection straight into SQL instead of using parameterized args. A malicious app (drozer, or adb shell content query) supplies a UNION or tautology selection and exfiltrates the secret column. On a device the real exported provider (content://com.dvma.provider.vuln/users) runs the concatenated query over a seeded SQLite database and returns the leaked rows; offline an in-memory engine mirrors it so the demo stays testable.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Improper Platform Usage category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an Android emulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: adb, drozer, jadx, sqlite3.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Content Provider SQL Injection (content_provider_sql_injection). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. From a co-resident/attacker context (adb shell am start/drozer, or a crafted deep link / QR), send the untrusted input to the exported component or WebView and confirm the app performs the unsafe action (navigation, JS execution, file/URI access) with no validation.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.
6. Map it back. Cross-reference the MASTG v2 test(s) MASTG-TEST-0339, MASTG-TEST-0355 for the canonical procedure and remediation.

Tools (optional)

• adb
• drozer
• jadx
• sqlite3