Clipboard -> Privileged Action Injection

← Improper Platform Usage

clipboard_to_privileged_action_injection   HARD

Description

Clipboard content sourced from an untrusted origin flows into a privileged action (auto-paste into a payment/command field, an assistant/automation step) with no validation or origin check, so a malicious page-to-clipboard write is laundered into a privileged operation (webpage -> clipboard -> automation -> privileged app capability boundary; CVE-2026-17766 cross-origin clipboard class).

How it works

Clipboard content sourced from an untrusted origin flows into a privileged action, an auto-paste into a payment field or an assistant/automation step, with no validation and no confirmation. The taint chain is untrusted origin, then clipboard, then automation, then privileged capability. Here a hostile page seeds a “pay to attacker” instruction and the automation executes the payment. The tainted value is placed on and read back from the real system clipboard; the payment-decision logic is the offline contrast. The secure path refuses clipboard values that did not originate from a trusted source, validates the payee against an allowlist, and requires explicit user confirmation.

How to exercise it. DVMA is the harness - open this module from the home index and tap the demo action. The screen ships the malicious input and simulates the attacker (e.g. the companion app, crafted intent, or scanned payload) in-process, and the evidence panel prints the proof. The Tools (optional) and Attack inputs below are only needed to reproduce the exploit end-to-end on a real device.

Exploit steps

1. Set up. Build DVMA with a flavor that enables the Improper Platform Usage category (e.g. --dart-define-from-file=config/flavors/dev.json) and run on an emulator/simulator you control. The demo needs no external tooling; for the optional on-device reproduction the relevant tools are: Android: adb · iOS: idb.
2. Locate the target. From the home index, open Clipboard -> Privileged Action Injection (clipboard_to_privileged_action_injection). The How it works section above describes this module’s specific weakness; the screen states the intended-secure behavior and exposes the vulnerable action.
3. Exploit. From a co-resident/attacker context (adb shell am start/drozer, or a crafted deep link / QR), send the untrusted input to the exported component or WebView and confirm the app performs the unsafe action (navigation, JS execution, file/URI access) with no validation.
4. Observe the evidence. Trigger the vulnerable action and read the evidence panel - it prints the concrete proof (leaked value, accepted replay, executed payload, or unauthorized result).
5. Contrast with the secure path. Run the module’s secure/hardened action (where provided) and confirm the same attack is rejected - this is what a correct implementation should do.

Tools (optional)

Android

• adb

iOS

• idb

Real-world references

Concrete public disclosures that match this vulnerability class:

• CVE-2026-17766 (Android Chrome clipboard cross-origin data leak)